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INTRODUCTION 
In The Accumulation of Advantages,1 the picture that Professor Owen Fiss 
paints about equality during and since the Second Reconstruction is largely a 
picture in black and white. That makes some sense. The black/white experience 
is probably the most important throughline in the story of equal protection. It 
was the central theme of both the First and Second Reconstructions. In keeping 
with that orientation, the picture of disadvantage described by Fiss’s theory of 
cumulative responsibility is largely drawn from the black/white experience. 
Important as it is, however, the black/white experience does not exhaust the 
subject of constitutional equality. So in thinking about the present condition of 
equal protection and its relationship to various constitutional Reconstructions—
the Second, the First, and, if we are fortunate, the Third—it is worth asking what 
that way of telling the story leaves out about equal protection since the Second 
Reconstruction ended. I will mention three such omissions. One of them is about 
gender, one is about wealth, and one is about race. 
First, in the realm of gender, the decades since the end of the Second 
Reconstruction have seen a series of progressive victories leading to, but not 
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limited to, the legalization of same-sex marriage.2 This transformation was close 
to unimaginable when the Second Reconstruction ended.3 
Second, the inequality between the wealthiest Americans and other 
Americans has grown immensely since the close of the Second Reconstruction.4 
The significance of this development transcends its impact on racial inequality, 
but it is certainly also relevant to the continuing inequality of the black 
underclass on whom Professor Fiss focuses. 
Third, American society is enormously more racially diverse than it was at 
the close of the Second Reconstruction. According to the Census Bureau, 99 
percent of Americans in 1960 were either black or white.5 In the early 1970s, 
when Griggs v. Duke Power Co.6 was decided, a higher proportion of the people 
living in the United States was native born than at any time since American 
Independence.7 Because of restrictive immigration laws that had been in place 
since the 1920s,8 the percentage of Americans who were immigrants had been 
declining steadily for half a century. By the 1960s, this percentage had fallen 
quite low.9 So the population at the time of Griggs looked, racially, both 
relatively dichotomous across the color line and also relatively static in 
composition. To be sure, even that population could be described as 
kaleidoscopically diverse if one disaggregated ethnicities within the white 
population, as Justice Powell did in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke.10 But however one measures the racial diversity of the American 
 
 2. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that states cannot offer marriage 
only to opposite-sex couples). 
 3. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, 
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013) (describing these developments). 
 4. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and 
Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419, 421 (2015) (stating “the United States has, over the last generation, 
experienced a dramatic rise in income inequality”). 
 5. The total population was 178 million. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1960 CENSUS OF 
POPULATION AND HOUSING 1–144 tbl.44 (1960). The 1960 Census did not count Hispanic or Latino 
persons as a separate demographic group; they were included within the categories “White” and 
“Negro.” Other sources put the Latino population of the U.S. in 1960 at around six million, or between 
three and four percent of the total. See, e.g., Antonio Flores, Facts on U.S. Latinos, 2015, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Sept. 18, 2017), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2017/09/18/facts-on-u-s-latinos [https://perma.cc/73QK-
Z448]. So the proportion of Americans who were at that time black or white and not Hispanic was 
roughly 96 percent. 
 6. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that Section 703(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 creates a cause of action for employment practices that cause disparately adverse impacts on the 
basis of race). 
 7. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3 
(2011), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/pdf/cspan_fb_slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8CU-78BW] 
(showing that in 1970, only 4.7 percent of the U.S. population was foreign born and that that percentage 
was the lowest ever). 
 8. See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (limiting or forbidding 
immigration from many countries). 
 9. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 7 (showing a steady decline in the foreign-born 
population from 14.7 percent in 1910 to 4.7 percent in 1970). 
 10. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295–97 (1978). 
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population near the end of the Second Reconstruction, the successor population 
today is tremendously more diverse. 
History never repeats itself precisely. Human society is too complicated for 
any generation to replicate all the conditions of some earlier period. Nonetheless, 
there are times when social patterns do look familiar to observers who are 
historically aware: history never quite repeats itself, but perhaps it sometimes 
rhymes. The three equality storylines that I’ve identified as prominent within the 
time since the Second Reconstruction all have analogs in storylines that followed 
the First Reconstruction. In the half century beginning with what historians of 
the white South generally call Redemption, there was a progressive revolution 
in the realm of law and gender, culminating in (but not limited to) the adoption 
of the Nineteenth Amendment.11 The differences between the richest Americans 
and everyone else increased dramatically through the period we call the Gilded 
Age. New kinds of immigrant populations arrived in the United States in large 
numbers, vastly increasing the diversity of America’s population. All of these 
changes occurred as progress toward racial equality remained stalled. The 
combination of these storylines, laid alongside those of the time since the Second 
Reconstruction, present enough of a historical rhyme to explain why some say 
we are now living through an advanced stage of the Second Redemption. 
I. 
FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO REDEMPTION 
Why did the Second Reconstruction end? One reason is that radical 
progress always ends, and usually quickly. Radical progress is not the normal 
state of society. Sometimes, and on some issues, progress does not occur at all. 
Sometimes progress happens gradually over a long period of time, and from the 
end looking back, one can see dramatic change. But when radical progress occurs 
quickly, it usually does so only for a relatively short time. Then the unusual 
conditions that fostered the moment of radical progress fade. 
While it lasted, Professor Fiss says, the Second Reconstruction gave force 
to an idea that he calls the Theory of Cumulative Responsibility.12 As I 
understand it, that theory has two aspects: one descriptive and one normative. As 
a descriptive theory, the Theory of Cumulative Responsibility insists that 
inequality, or perhaps the specific sort of inequality that exists between 
privileged and disadvantaged demographic groups, is the product of 
discrimination in many different settings, rather than a single setting. What 
creates the system of hierarchy is the combined force of many mutually 
reinforcing social processes. As a normative theory, the Theory of Cumulative 
Responsibility insists that society collectively has a duty to redress the system of 
 
 11. In my view, the movement that produced the Nineteenth Amendment can usefully be 
understood as the same movement that, at a later stage, would produce same-sex marriage. See infra 
Part IV. 
 12. Fiss, supra note 1, at 1946. 
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inequality that those mutually reinforcing discriminatory processes create and 
sustain. In the Theory of Cumulative Responsibility, the descriptive claim takes 
“responsibility” to be a synonym for “causation.” The normative claim takes 
“responsibility” as a synonym for “obligation.” 
Washington v. Davis13 was an important blow to the normative form of the 
Theory of Cumulative Responsibility. By rejecting a disparate impact standard 
in equal protection cases, that decision took courts out of the business of 
correcting the self-reinforcing effects of prior discrimination, except where 
specifically instructed to do so by regulation or statute. Fiss’s article Groups and 
the Equal Protection Clause14 joined issue with Washington v. Davis in a 
fundamental way. Under the article’s Group Disadvantaging Principle, courts 
would interpret equal protection as prohibiting laws causing status-harm to 
disadvantaged groups.15 The Group Disadvantaging Principle is thus both an 
early articulation of the normative claim of the Theory of Cumulative 
Responsibility and an argument against Washington v. Davis, which was one of 
the most important decisions marking the end of the Second Reconstruction.16 
II. 
CROSON AND CUMULATIVE RESPONSIBILITY 
Here, however, I want to focus on a different Supreme Court case relevant 
to the Theory of Cumulative Responsibility—one that is significant for both that 
theory’s descriptive aspect and its normative aspect. The case is City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson,17 decided in 1989. Croson was the first case in which 
the Court squarely held that all racially classificatory affirmative action 
programs undertaken by state governments are subject to strict scrutiny.18 For 
present purposes, I focus on Justice O’Connor’s analysis of what sorts of 
discrimination an institution is responsible for correcting. 
The Croson Court held that the affirmative action program at issue was 
subject to strict scrutiny, meaning in part that it could be justified only by some 
compelling state interest. According to Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion, a 
public institution has a compelling interest in correcting the continuing effects 
 
 13. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a showing of disparate racial impact does not establish an 
equal protection violation). 
 14. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). 
 15. Id. at 157. 
 16. I largely agree with Professor Fiss’s criticisms of Washington v. Davis, both as to the rule 
of law it established and as to the aggressive way in which the Court reached out to establish that rule. 
See id. The broad constitutional statement about disparate impact was not at all required by the case as 
it was litigated. Students who know Washington v. Davis mainly from casebooks (and practitioners who 
know it pretty much as “the thing that stands for the proposition that equal protection plaintiffs must 
plead discriminatory purpose”) probably have a sense of that case as having been much cleaner than it 
actually was. 
 17. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 18. Id. 
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of its own past discrimination.19 But public institutions have no compelling 
interest, Justice O’Connor wrote, in correcting the continuing effects of past 
discriminatory actions taken by other actors in society.20 Justice O’Connor seems 
to have taken the view that cleaning up your own mess is your particular 
responsibility––a responsibility powerful enough to justify using generally 
disfavored tools like racial classification. But you cannot use those tools to clean 
up someone else’s mess. When the mess is someone else’s, you have no special 
responsibility justifying the use of extreme measures. 
One can imagine Justice O’Connor here as naïve or as knowing. If we 
imagine her opinion as naïve, we could read it to say that the effects of past 
discrimination exist in society as separate messes, here and there. The causes of 
the disadvantages that persons of disadvantaged racial groups experience can be 
isolated; the effects of discrimination exist separately, as the results of discrete 
acts of discrimination, rather than as the cumulative effects of a mutually 
reinforcing web of discriminations. This view is, of course, the opposite view 
from the one proposed by the Theory of Cumulative Responsibility. 
I doubt Justice O’Connor was that naïve. So it makes sense also to consider 
an interpretation of her opinion as knowing—an interpretation on which she 
understood perfectly well that racial inequality is not, as a descriptive matter, 
sensibly disaggregated into separate instances of disadvantage, each of which 
results from a discrete act of discrimination within a discrete social setting. 
Perhaps Justice O’Connor understood the descriptive aspect of the Theory of 
Cumulative Responsibility only too well. Perhaps it was precisely her 
understanding that racial inequality results from a thick web of discriminatory 
actions spanning the breadth of American society that attracted her to Croson’s 
limiting rule. 
In the context of Croson, the consequence of treating racial inequality as 
the combined product of discrimination across many different social settings, 
and of recognizing that redressing one discriminatory practice is unlikely to solve 
any underlying problem if the surrounding discriminatory practices go 
unredressed, would be to give broad authorization for affirmative action. At issue 
in the case, after all, was how freely affirmative action could be used. The 
particular question, in relevant part, was whether an institution could engage in 
racially classificatory affirmative action on the grounds that the affirmative-
action practice would redress the continuing effects of “societal 
discrimination”—that is, discrimination by other actors, or by the full set of 
social actors—rather than by the specific institution whose affirmative-action 
practice is at issue. Justice O’Connor did not think affirmative action was 
categorically unconstitutional. But she did think it should be rare. In her view, 
practicing race-based affirmative action has important costs, so it should not 
 
 19. Id. at 492. 
 20. Id. at 505–06. 
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become a standard operating procedure. Thinking of the continuing effects of 
past discrimination as flowing from scores of social phenomena together makes 
it hard to limit the remedy to exceptional cases. To limit the use of the costly 
remedy, it helps to think of discrimination as occurring in discrete settings: this 
discrete act of discrimination caused these discrete consequences, and the 
specific institution involved—but only that institution—has a compelling 
interest in remedying the particular damage it caused. 
Justice O’Connor’s approach strove to make the racial aspects of American 
social structure less visible. From a certain perspective, that is a virtue of the 
approach. Race is a sensitive topic, and making race salient can often be divisive. 
It is therefore sometimes a good idea, even when trying to remedy problems of 
racial disadvantage, to deflect attention from race. This approach is, of course, 
directly contrary to the approach favored by the Theory of Cumulative 
Responsibility. That theory strives to increase the visibility of the racial aspect 
of our social structure. It wants to shine a light on the broad set of practices that 
reinforce racial hierarchy and to point out, clearly, the pernicious effects that 
those practices have, even beyond their local domains. That is the move the Court 
made in Gaston County v. United States,21 near the height of the Second 
Reconstruction, by linking past discrimination in schools to ongoing racial 
dynamics in voting, rather than saying that schools are one thing and voting is 
another. Croson goes the other way: it narrows the frame. It focuses equal 
protection on specific transactions within specific institutions. In so doing, it 
shifts the focus of equal protection away from the general hierarchical ordering 
of demographic groups in society and toward discrete acts of discrimination 
practiced by specified decisionmakers against specified individual victims. 
III. 
INDIVIDUALISM AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
It is well known that individualist analysis waxed, and analysis based on 
group disadvantage waned, in equal protection cases from the time of Griggs and 
Gaston County through the time of Croson.22 A lot of academic literature has 
criticized this development.23 One central criticism emphasizes that 
individualism alone cannot generate a workable approach to equal protection; 
 
 21. 395 U.S. 285 (1969). 
 22. See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 493, 552–65 (2003) (analyzing the ideas of individualism and group treatment in 
disparate impact law). 
 23. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing against an equal protection jurisprudence 
that requires plaintiffs to prove deliberate discriminatory intent, pointing to the subconscious patterns of 
discrimination that are latent in America’s historical and cultural heritage); Reva Siegel, Why Equal 
Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
1111, 1141–45 (1997) (arguing that equal protection litigation employing a disparate impact standard 
would more successfully disestablish historic patterns of race stratification). 
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any workable theory of equal protection needs a way of specifying the axes of 
discrimination to which it will be sensitive, and the simple idea that all people 
should be treated equally cannot so specify. Why, for example, should equal 
protection care more about discrimination on the basis of race and sex than 
discrimination on the basis of the first letter of one’s last name? A theory that 
grounds equal protection in a concern for redressing unjust social hierarchies can 
answer that question: it is because some axes of difference map unjust social 
hierarchies and others do not.24 It is more difficult to answer this question under 
a theory of pure individualism. No workable theory can be equally sensitive to 
any differentiation between individuals, because garden-variety governance 
routinely and properly classifies individuals and treats them differently on the 
basis of those classifications. (Children may not drive. Michiganders may not 
vote in Ohio elections. Only licensed physicians may prescribe narcotics.) 
Without more, the value of individualism cannot sort the unproblematic bases of 
classification from the disfavored ones. 
It does not follow, though, that individualism is a misplaced value in equal 
protection. It follows only that individualism cannot be the sole value. For a 
combination of reasons, some flawed and some excellent, the ideal of individual-
based equality is deeply attractive in American culture. That ideal seems to 
capture the intuitions that each person has the same inherent worth, that people 
are entitled to succeed and fail and generally to be judged on the basis of their 
own characteristics rather than those of groups to which they involuntarily 
belong, and that all of America—perhaps all of humanity—is in the end a single 
social group in which autonomous individuals can be mobile captains of their 
own fates. These ideals have serious limits, but they also have powerful 
attractions. And partly because of those attractions, the individualist impulse in 
equal protection is a powerful one. 
To reflect on both the appeal and the limits of that impulse, consider a great 
American cultural artifact that was born at the height of the Second 
Reconstruction: Sesame Street. The program debuted in 1969, five months after 
the Supreme Court decided Gaston County.25 Within a short time, Sesame Street 
became a beloved and ubiquitous piece of American culture, so much so that we 
may not stop to think about what distinctive social vision it might represent. But 
it definitely represents one—one that was distinctively progressive in 1969, just 
a year after the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and the urban rioting that 
followed, but whose politics in the twenty-first century are considerably more 
ambiguous. 
 
 24. Yes, constitutional law then needs a substantive account of justice in order to identify what 
counts as an unjust social hierarchy. How deeply theorized that account must be, and how the relevant 
account should be assembled, are important questions beyond the scope of this Essay. 
 25. It happens that I was born during the five-month interval between those two events. Whether 
my interest in the tensions within equal protection doctrine was accordingly fated from my birth is a 
question I will leave to others. 
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Sesame Street rose to prominence in the 1970s while showcasing a 
particular kind of classical liberal vision. In the multiracial urban neighborhood 
it depicts, the characters are highly diverse, and their demographic differences 
are of little or no consequence. The show’s foundational social premise and 
central ethos was that all of us are equal individuals, regardless of where we 
come from or what we look like. Black kids and white kids, English-speakers 
and Spanish-speakers, boys and girls, big yellow birds and fuzzy blue monsters: 
We’re all the same underneath. It is a thoroughly individualist vision, and a 
lovely one. 
But here’s an important thing to remember about Sesame Street: it is a fully 
integrated neighborhood. Everyone’s ascriptive group characteristics really are 
irrelevant—irrelevant, that is, to their life chances, their social power, their day-
to-day experience. Nobody on Sesame Street has better schools, medical care, or 
police protection than anyone else. Sesame Street features adults and children, 
but no character on Sesame Street has parents: like everyone else, the children 
exist without differentiated backstories and therefore without the unequal 
resource endowments that real people come into the world with as accidents of 
birth. It is a society where no past injustices have legacy effects giving people 
different starting points in life. In a world like that, there is no need to think in 
terms of redressing social hierarchies. So a vision of equality as individualism 
alone is all the more appropriate. 
Very few real American neighborhoods have that level of integration, let 
alone that level of autonomy from the past. In our society, where no casually 
multiracial paradise has yet been achieved, unjust social hierarchies matter a 
great deal. 
IV. 
SEX, GENDER, AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
The tools of Griggs and Gaston County are not now doing much to move 
society toward the vision offered on Sesame Street. The increased emphasis on 
individualism within equal protection doctrine, and indeed within 
antidiscrimination law generally, has meant that disparate impact standards are 
often understood as evidentiary dragnets for identifying intentional 
discrimination, not as tools for redressing unjust social hierarchies. Indeed, it 
may be that disparate impact doctrine can only survive in that trimmed form, 
because treating it as a more aggressive tool of reform would slight individualist 
values in ways that might render the doctrine constitutionally suspect. Taken 
together, the trimming of Griggs in Washington v. Davis and the decision 
limiting affirmative action in Croson constitute the spine of the limits of equal 
protection as a tool for advancing racial equality in the decades since the Second 
Reconstruction ended. 
The limits of equal protection as a tool for reducing racial inequality in 
recent decades appear in sharp relief when contrasted with developments in the 
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realm of gender inequality. In the latter arena, the last few decades have seen an 
egalitarian transformation barely imaginable when Washington v. Davis was 
decided. That transformation includes, but is not limited to, the coming of legal 
same-sex marriage. Technically, of course, the Supreme Court’s same-sex 
marriage decision sounded more in the register of due process than that of equal 
protection. But whatever Justice Kennedy may have written—and he wrote more 
than one odd thing in Obergefell v. Hodges—the substance of the constitutional 
rule barring states from limiting marriage to same-sex partners is best understood 
as a matter of equal protection. 
As a fundamental matter, the relevant equal protection analysis is not just 
about discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, though of course that sort 
of analysis could have decided the case in the same way. It is about 
discrimination on the basis of sex. If a woman wants to marry a woman and is 
denied a license for doing so, but would have been granted the license had she 
been a man, she is discriminated against on the basis of her sex, plain and simple. 
Laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex partners should therefore get 
heightened scrutiny like all other laws that classify and discriminate on the basis 
of sex. This sex-discrimination argument sounds in the register of 
individualism.26 It is entirely at home in modern equal protection law. And it is, 
on its own terms, a fully compelling argument. 
What’s more, it is an argument that goes to the deep underlying nature of 
the transformation that brought about same-sex marriage. The movement for 
equality for LGBTQ persons is, both historically and conceptually, an advanced 
stage of the same movement that insisted on equality for women. The 
fundamental claim of that movement is that the law may not assign people to 
social roles on the basis of biological sex. To be sure, there are ways in which 
the particulars of LGBTQ liberation differ from the particulars of sex equality in 
a heteronormative context, just as there are different particulars for L, G, B, T, 
and Q (and such other initials as may be added). But it is not an accident that 
same-sex marriage gained legal footing so quickly after sex discrimination 
became a topic of heightened equal protection scrutiny, where “quickly” is 
reckoned in the sweep of constitutional time. To pull the frame out more broadly, 
it is not an accident that once centuries of legalized patriarchy officially gave 
way to the idea of equal status for women and men, it took only one generation 
more for the law to give up the requirement of opposite-sex partners in marriage. 
Once the law no longer insisted on different roles and entitlements for husbands 
and wives, it was difficult to understand why one of each should be necessary. 
This social transformation should not be underestimated. The breakdown 
of legally enforced gender roles is an enormous reordering of a core aspect of 
human society, and it operates in a decidedly progressive direction. The 
 
 26. It also sounds in the register of group hierarchy, inasmuch as requiring gender differentiation 
in marriage perpetuates a more general system of legal gender differentiation that helps preserve a 
system of gender roles in which power is disproportionately allocated to men. 
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magnitude of the change from, say, the middle of the nineteenth century to the 
second decade of the twenty-first is staggering. But it has left the problem of 
racial hierarchy more or less unresolved. That problem persists, at tremendous 
human cost. And as noted above, one of the central legal tools that could help 
redress it—the doctrine of disparate impact—now hangs by a thread. 
Professor Fiss contends that the thread is strong enough to hold. In his view, 
Justice Kennedy—whose vote for some years controlled the Supreme Court’s 
decisionmaking on the relevant issues—exhibited a growing awareness, over 
time, of the need for law to be attentive to unjust racial hierarchies. I agree that 
Kennedy moved some distance in that direction during his career. One need only 
compare his opinions in Grutter27 and Ricci28 to his opinions in Inclusive 
Communities29 and Fisher30 to see that Justice Kennedy in his later years was, if 
not exactly woke, then not quite comatose, either. 
I suspect, however, that it is a mistake to imagine that the future of 
constitutional doctrine depends much on Justice Kennedy’s trajectory. His views 
were those of a Justice, not those of an institution. His tenure as the determinative 
Justice lasted for more than a decade, but now that it is over, there is no reason 
to think that his particular thinking will continue to constrain constitutional 
doctrine. And to think about what the future of this area might look like, I suggest 
that it is necessary to pose the question within two different frames. 
The first frame is the frame of normal constitutional time. Within that 
rubric, the analysis begins by noting that the Supreme Court has had a majority 
of Republican-appointed Justices at all times since 1969—the year in which 
Gaston County was decided, and two years before Griggs was decided. Quite 
clearly, several Republican-appointed Justices since 1969 have thought disparate 
impact doctrine compatible with equal protection. Were it otherwise, disparate 
impact doctrine would long since have disappeared, if indeed it had ever 
appeared in the first place. 
But the fact that disparate impact doctrine has long coexisted with a 
majority-Republican Supreme Court means little for the question of the 
doctrine’s future viability. As relevant here, Justices appointed by Republican 
Presidents in the twenty-first century are not the same as Justices appointed by 
Republican Presidents in the twentieth. The set of twentieth-century Republican 
appointees was internally diverse on questions of race and equal protection. 
Some, like Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, held views that would seem to 
 
 27. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting from decision upholding 
race-based affirmative action at the University of Michigan Law School). 
 28. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (Kennedy, J.) (invalidating municipality’s 
measures to prevent a firefighter-promotion system from causing a disparately adverse impact on 
nonwhite candidates). 
 29. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) 
(Kennedy, J.) (holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act). 
 30. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (upholding affirmative action at the 
University of Texas). 
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augur poorly for disparate impact doctrine.31 Others, like Kennedy and 
O’Connor, had more moderate views. And that is to say nothing of Justices 
David Souter and John Paul Stevens, or, for that matter, Chief Justice Warren 
Burger, who wrote Griggs, or Justice John Marshall Harlan, who wrote Gaston 
County. But the Republican Party has moved in recent decades, and the elite 
legal wing of that party from which federal judges are recruited is much less 
diverse on the relevant issues. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel 
Alito, appointed in the twenty-first century, do not share Kennedy’s perspective 
on race in equal protection.32 There is little reason to think that later Republican 
appointees will, either.33 
There are reasons why no Justice appointed in the twenty-first century is 
likely to share Kennedy’s perspective. Members of the elite legal wings of both 
major political parties are now socialized early in their careers. Within each 
party, that socialization usually includes the absorption of attitudes about 
important constitutional issues, including issues of race and equal protection. To 
be sure, many law students and young lawyers are drawn to one party or the other 
because of their preexisting attitudes on these issues: the lawyers who become 
federal judges are not blank slates before entering the profession. But under 
current conditions, the reason why no Republican President is likely to appoint 
a Justice like Kennedy is not merely that a candidate with Kennedy’s views 
would probably be deemed unacceptable by relevant gatekeepers within the 
Republican Party’s judicial vetting apparatus. It is also that there are not many 
high-level lawyers at mid-career or younger who have Kennedy’s views in the 
first place.34 This does not mean, of course, that anyone can know for certain that 
affirmative action and disparate impact doctrine will be declared fully 
unconstitutional once a majority of the Justices are twenty-first century 
Republican appointees. But if that happens, nobody should be surprised. 
Professor Fiss also notes that Presidents do not have unlimited discretion to 
choose Supreme Court Justices.35 The Senate acts as a gatekeeper. And Professor 
Fiss suggests that the Senate’s gatekeeping role may also act to prevent the 
appointment of Justices who would reject Griggs entirely. I am skeptical. The 
Senate as currently constituted has many members who were willing to endorse 
Roy Moore as a candidate to represent Alabama in their chamber. Moore’s 
bigotries are well known and overt. It is hard to see why officials willing to 
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endorse Moore would stand against a presidential nominee merely because the 
nominee took a dim view of disparate impact doctrine. 
Indeed, the near election of Moore, and the actual presidency of Donald 
Trump, require a deeper rethinking of the role of equal protection doctrine, and 
not in a happy direction. For several decades prior to 2017, a going assumption 
in constitutional law had been that most governmental discrimination is hidden 
and likely unconscious.36 The problem, this thinking went, is less about 
purposeful discrimination than it is about selective indifference—that is, the 
phenomenon by which public officials fail to think about the interests of 
marginalized populations.37 It is not that officials want to make life hard for those 
marginalized groups; it is that officials don’t make the effort to find ways of 
governing that will avoid making life hard for them. Against the background of 
that assumption, disparate impact doctrine has had an important role. It identifies 
practices that disproportionately burden marginalized populations, drags them 
into the light, and makes the government think hard about whether those 
practices are necessary. But in the age of Moore and Trump, equal protection 
may confront more than selective indifference. We have other problems now. 
As a result, it is necessary to consider the possible future of equal protection 
within a second frame. It is the frame not of normal constitutional time but of 
constitutional rot.38 
CONCLUSION 
The American Republic is in greater jeopardy of self-destruction today than 
at any time since the 1870s.39 The problems creating that danger did not begin 
with the election of President Donald Trump. They had been gathering steam for 
some time. But since the election of 2016, the phenomenon has been fully 
manifest. And one feature of the present moment is that the constitutional future 
is limited by an unusually short event horizon. During the last two years, many 
things have happened that well-informed observers would have said, only a short 
time before, do not happen in American government. We should accordingly 
have little confidence in our ability to foresee what the next year or two will 
bring. So many things could happen. 
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In a period of normal constitutional time, I would worry about the viability 
of disparate impact doctrine and, more generally, that of the theory of collective 
responsibility. Under current conditions, however, the most pressing worries are 
considerably larger. Our constitutional order has bigger problems. 
But it also has great possibilities. The Republic is, as noted before, in 
greater danger of self-destruction than at any time since the 1870s. Americans 
now living face serious threats to the constitutional order with no more guarantee 
of success than the Americans who faced the nineteenth century’s central 
constitutional struggle. There is no knowing where our slice of history will go. 
But we do know this: that earlier struggle was followed by a Reconstruction. If 
we can meet the present challenge, perhaps we can bring about another one. 
Because there is no going back to the Second Reconstruction, nor even to the 
late twentieth-century conditions that prevailed after the Second Reconstruction 
found its limits. For better or for worse, what comes next will be different from 
what came before. So the hope for a future in which something like the Theory 
of Collective Responsibility is realized now rests precisely where the hope for a 
healthy American constitutional order must rest in general: in a vision of, and a 
determination to work for, nothing less than a Third Reconstruction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
